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Discretionary Sentencing in Military
Commissions: Why and How the Sentencing
Guidelines in the Military Commissions Act
Should be Changed*
Brian Wolensky**
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, during the early days of the “War on Terror,” United
States officials captured Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the personal
driver and bodyguard of Osama Bin Laden, while he was
transporting weapons across the Afghani border.1 From 2002
until his trial in 2008, Hamdan was classified as an enemy
combatant2 pursuant to the Geneva Convention3 and detained at

* This article was initially written and published when the state of military
commissions were in flux. It reflects the events regarding military commissions up to and
through April 2009. However, an important decision was made by President Obama in
May of 2009. See William Glaberson, Obama Considers Allowing Please by 9/11
Suspects, N. Y. TIMES, June 6, 2009, at A1, A12. Obama decided to continue the use of
military commissions under a new set of rules which provide more protections for
detainees. Id. Due to the timing of publication, this decision is not incorporated in this
article. Although Obama has decided to continue the military commissions, he has not
finalized a set of rules. Id. This article serves as a recommendation for changes to the
rules of the Military Commissions Act, which Congress and the Obama Administration
should consider.
** J.D. candidate 2010, Chapman University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Kyndra Rotunda for all of her guidance, feedback, and expertise. I would also
like to thank the outgoing and incoming Chapman Law Review boards for their excellent
work and careful review. Finally, I would like to extend a special thank you to my family
and friends for without all of their love, support, guidance, and patience this note would
not have been possible.
1 Although Hamdan was considered a low level player in Al Qaeda, he was fairly
involved with the group. See Charge Sheet of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, United States v.
Hamdan (Feb. 2, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d2007Hamdan%20%20Notification%20of%20Sworn%20Charges.pdf.
2 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). “Citizens who associate themselves
with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction
enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the
Hague Convention and the law of war.” Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942). The
definition of enemy combatants, as described in Ex parte Quirin, was reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in 2004. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). This classification
is important because an enemy combatant can be detained until the end of a current
conflict, and is subject to trial by military commission. Id. at 521. Further, the United
States has classified members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and associated forces as unlawful
enemy combatants, and defines an unlawful enemy combatant as “a person who has
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Guantanamo Bay. On August 7, 2008, Hamdan was the first
Guantanamo detainee convicted by a United States Military
Commission—governed by the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA)—for providing material support for terrorism.4 Hamdan
was sentenced to five and a half years in prison. However, the
military commission judge granted “administrative credit”5 for
time served since Hamdan’s capture in 2001.6 As a result,
Hamdan only had to serve five additional months.
Hamdan’s case, the first application of the MCA,7 showed
weaknesses in the current military commission system,
particularly with regard to sentencing.8 These weaknesses must
be fixed to ensure that detainees will be given a fair trial as
commissions go forward.9 In the words of Thomas Paine, “[h]e
that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his
enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes
a precedent that will reach to himself.”10
engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities
against the United States or its co-belligerents.” 10 U.S.C. § 948a (Supp. 2008).
3 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
4 See William Glaberson, Panel Sentences Bin Laden Driver to a Short Term, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/washington/
08gitmo.html?partner=rssnyt. Although Hamdan was the first case to be completed by a
military commission, in 2007 David Hicks, an Australian detainee, entered a guilty plea
and was given a nine month sentence and thus became the first detainee to be released
via the MCA. David McFadden, Gitmo Jury: Life Sentence for Bin Laden Videomaker,
ABC NEWS, Nov. 3, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6169091 (last visited Mar. 8,
2008).
5 An administrative credit is the reduction of a sentence by allowing time held to
count forward. After administrative credit was granted to Hamdan, the Government
challenged the commission’s authority to grant such credit. See Corrected Government
Motion for Reconsideration, United States v. Hamdan (Sep. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/us-motion-re-hamdansentence-9-24-08.pdf.
6 Jerry Markon & Josh White, Bin Laden Driver Gets 5 1/2 Years; U.S. Sought 30,
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2008, at A1.
7 Although Hamdan was the first case to be completed by a military commission, on
November 4, 2008, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was sentenced to life in prison.
McFadden, supra note 4. Al Bahlul is seen as an extremist who has publicly expressed
interest in destroying the United States. See Charge Sheet of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman
al Bahlul, United States v. al Bahlul, (Feb. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Charge Sheet of al
Bahlul], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2008/d20080208bahlul.pdf. It
is interesting to note that the decision did not appear in many newspapers and hardly
received national coverage. This could be due to the fact that many people believe al
Bahlul belongs in jail for life. However, it is most likely due to the fact that the decision
was handed down the day before the 2008 Presidential Election.
8 One obvious problem that surfaced is whether administrative credit can be
granted. See Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5 (“The
accused is not entitled to administrative credit because nothing in law or regulation
authorizes such credit.”).
9 See McFadden, supra note 4.
10 THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATION ON FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1795),
reprinted in THE THOMAS PAINE READER 452, 470 (1987).
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Amid the growing criticism of the use of military
commissions,11 President Barack Obama issued an Executive
Order shutting down Guantanamo Bay and suspending the use
of the commissions until their procedures are reviewed and a
course of action planned.12 While shutting down Guantanamo
may be viewed as a publicity move,13 abandoning military
commissions and the MCA would be a catastrophic move that
could have devastating effects. The MCA is by no means
perfect—in fact, as discussed throughout, its sentencing
guidelines, among other things, must be changed—however,
abandoning the MCA at this point would take the United States
back to square one.
In summation, current military commissions and the MCA
are not perfect, however, it is the most just system in place and it
may not be practical to start anew; therefore, it is crucial to
improve the MCA while continuing its use. The sentencing
guidelines provided by the MCA, which grant wide discretion to
the commissions, is surely an area requiring improvement. The
goal of this Comment is to analyze the sentencing guidelines and
rules to propose changes that should be made.14
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history and
description of military commissions and explains where the
authority for commissions originated—particularly the United
States Constitution,15 Supreme Court jurisprudence,16 and the
Law of War.17 Part I further examines the significance of the
11 See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FACT SHEET: MILITARY COMMISSIONS
ACT, available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/legpriorities2007p2.pdf [hereinafter ACLU
FACT SHEET].
12 Section 3 of the Order deals with the closure of Guantanamo, while Section 7 halts
the current military commissions. Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22,
2009).
13 See Daphne Eviatar, Why Closing Gitmo Isn’t Enough, WASH. INDEP., Nov. 14,
2008, http://washingtonindependent.com/18503/why-closing-gitmo-isnt-enough (providing
general objections to Guantanamo Bay) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). But see Kyndra
Miller Rotunda, Don’t Close Gitmo, WASH. TIMES, June 23, 2008, at A24 (citing numerous
reasons why keeping Guantanamo open is the best course of action for the United States).
14 Although the current state of the MCA and military commissions are in flux, the
suggestions in this Comment are applicable to any decision that may be made regarding
the commissions. If the commissions are reinstated, or if a new type of court or system is
established, this Comment serves as guidance for those commissions or systems as well.
Further, as will be discussed below, military commissions have been established in almost
every war in American history, thus, this Comment offers sentencing guidance for future
commissions.
15 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 9, 10.
16 See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (allowing the President to
convene and order trial by military commission); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 634–35 (2006) (finding the military commissions authorized by the President
unconstitutional, but inviting Congress to write rules governing military commissions).
17 The Law of War consists of two components: (1) treatises, conventions, and
agreements between countries and (2) custom. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE REPORT ON
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MCA and explains the reasons why the United States must
continue to use military commissions.
Part II looks in depth at the MCA, examining the strong
congressional intent to provide fair trials to detainees while still
preserving United States’ national security.18 Part II also
explores the policy reasons behind the sentencing guidelines in
the MCA, in particular why such wide degree of discretion was
given to the commission with respect to sentencing. Next, Part
III describes the problems with the current sentencing guidelines
in the MCA, focusing on the problems of (1) administrative credit
and (2) excessive commission discretion in sentencing.
Finally, Part IV proposes a solution to the ambiguities in the
sentencing guidelines. These changes, if adopted, will provide
stability for military commissions, helping to legitimize their use.
Further, the changes will ensure that each convicted terrorist is
given a fair sentence that is in proportion to the crime
committed, while preserving national security.
I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY
COMMISSIONS
Before probing into any problems the MCA may or may not
have, an overview of the military commissions, its evolution and
significance is important to understand. This Part will define
and provide a brief history and the authority that created the
commissions as well as the importance of the MCA and
continuation of the military commissions.
A. A Brief Background of Military Commissions
Under the MCA, a military commission is a court operated
by the military “to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged
in hostilities against the United States for violations of the Law

CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, 31 I.L.M. 612, 615 (1992) (“The United
States . . . are parties to numerous law of war treaties intended to minimize unnecessary
suffering by combatants and noncombatants during war.”);; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
DIRECTIVE NO. 2311.01E, LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, sec. 3.1. (May 9, 2006), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101p.pdf (defining the law of war as
“[t]hat part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities”).
18 See generally 152 Cong. Rec. S10354 (2006).
Military Commissions provide:
“Judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples for purposes of
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; “Appropriate protection of national security
interests; and Protection and safety for all personnel participating in the process,
including the accused.” U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET: MILITARY COMMISSIONS
(2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2007/OMC%20Fact%20Sheet%
20Aug%2007.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET].
THE
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of War and other offenses.”19 Throughout history there have
been thousands of combatants subject to rulings by military
commissions.20 However, there is a strong likelihood that many
of these combatants did not receive a fair trial because of a desire
to quickly punish combatants for their alleged war crimes.21
As countries became civilized, military courts evolved.
Although not officially dubbed “military commissions,” the first
military courts in the United States were established to try a spy
immediately following the American Revolution, and then again
in 1818 to try two British Indian traders for assisting Native
Americans in the Seminole Wars.22 The actual term “military
commission” was not coined until the Mexican-American War in
1847.23 Over the next century and a half, military commissions
developed rapidly and were utilized heavily in the Civil War and
both World War I and World War II.24 In 2001, President Bush
issued an executive order instituting military commissions to try
those detained as enemy combatants during the War on Terror.25
1. Domestic and International Authority: The Constitution
and Law of War and the Involvement with the
Development of the Military Commission
The Constitution gives Congress the power to create military
commissions.
It states that Congress has the power to
“constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court”26 and to

19 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (Supp. 2008). Military commissions are used rather than
civilian courts because, according to President Bush, “the rules for trying enemy
combatants in a time of conflict must be different from those for trying common criminals
or members of our own military.” News Release, The White House, President George W.
Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists
(Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2006/09/20060906-3.html.
20 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 834 (2d ed., rev. & enl.,
William S. Hein & Co. 2000) (1920) (finding that during the Civil War and Reconstruction
there were over 2000 combatants tried by military commission).
21 MAROUF HASIAN, JR., IN THE NAME OF NECESSITY: MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE
LOSS OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 2 (2005) (claiming that because foreign military
tribunals violate human rights, do not provide a fair and equal trial, and lack civilian
oversight, our military commission system also will not be just).
22 WINTHROP, supra note 20, at 832. For a brief description of the history and
character of military commissions, including their use in previous wars, see John Yoo, An
Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 83, 84–99
(2006).
23 Id. (“Assassination, murder, poisoning, rape, or the attempt to commit either,
malicious stabbing or maiming, malicious assault and battery, robbery, theft,
. . . committed by Mexicans or other civilians in Mexico against individuals of the U.S.
military forces . . . should be brought to trial before ‘military commissions.’”).
24 LEONARD CUTLER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR: MILITARY
COMMISSIONS AND ENEMY COMBATANTS POST 9/11 4, 7 (2005); Yoo, supra note 22, at 91.
25 Exec. Order No. 01-28904, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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“define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”27
Further, Congress has the power to “declare War,” and “raise and
support Armies.”28 The Constitution explicitly gave Congress
war powers and, as such, “[t]he commission is simply an
instrumentality for the more efficient execution of the war
powers vested in Congress and the power vested in the President
as Commander-in-chief in war.”29
Although Congress has the power to create military
commissions, it must be mindful of international law. The Law
of War is the main governing principle that countries must follow
during times of conflict.30 One of the main treatises included in
the Law of War is the Third Geneva Convention, which was
enacted in 1949 to regulate the treatment of prisoners of war. 31
The Law of War places restrictions on the way certain countries
can act during times of war and the United States is bound by it
when it establishes and uses military commissions.32
2.

Judicial Authority: Key Supreme Court Decisions and
their Consequences on the Evolution of Military
Commissions
A major reason for the evolution of military commissions has
been the involvement of the United States Supreme Court.
Arguably, the most important case was Ex parte Quirin, in which
a military commission was used to try and convict eight German
saboteurs during World War II.33 The United States Supreme
Court held:
By [the President’s] Order creating the present Commission he has
undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress,
and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the
Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions
which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the
nation in time of war.34

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 12.
WINTHROP, supra note 20, at 831.
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR,
supra note 17; U.S DEP’T. OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO. 2311.01E, supra note 17.
31 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
32 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625 (2006).
33 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21–23 (1942). Ex parte Quirin involved facts similar
to those surrounding September 11. First, the saboteurs were not wearing uniforms and
were thus unidentifiable as combatants. Second, the attacks were planned in the United
States. Id.
34 Id. at 28.
27
28
29
30
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The Court went on to say that there is a strong presumption that
military commissions are constitutional, and there must be a
contrary showing before they will be struck down.35
Roughly sixty years later, military commissions are again at
issue before the Court due to the War on Terror.36 In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the Court found the conditions and procedures used by
President Bush’s military commissions were not valid because,
among other things, they violated the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.37 In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed,
stating:
[A]s presently structured, Hamdan’s military commission exceeds the
bounds Congress has placed on the President’s authority in . . . the
UCMJ. Because Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can
change them, requiring a new analysis consistent with the
Constitution and other governing laws. At this time, however, we
must apply the standards Congress has provided.38

However, the Court seemingly invited Congress to rewrite the
rules governing military commissions.39 Congress responded to
Hamdan by enacting the MCA, which provides detailed
procedures on the use of military commissions.40
A strong history, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court
all provide authority to establish and use military commissions.
Currently, military commissions are being used to try detainees
in Guantanamo Bay for war crimes. To date, the Court has not
ruled on the constitutionality of these military commissions. The
first trial by military commission since World War II came to a
close in August 2008 when Salim Ahmed Hamdan was convicted
of providing material support to terrorism.41 Because military
commissions are finally available and ready to move forward,
their use should continue.

35 Id. at 28.
For another Supreme Court case supporting the use of military
commissions, see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7–8, 25 (1946) (holding that a military
court has the jurisdiction to rule on a commander’s actions, and their ruling will be given
great deference).
36 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), was one of the first cases before the
Supreme Court regarding the War on Terror and the war in Iraq. Although not
exclusively dealing with military commissions, the court found that the Government must
come up with some criteria in holding enemy combatants, and must give all enemy
combatants a chance to be heard. Id. at 509. For another current case involving
detainees and the War on Terror, see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (allowing access
to federal courts by detainees).
37 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 634–35 (2006).
38 Id. at 653 (Breyer, J., concurring).
39 Id.
40 See generally 10 U.S.C. § 948b (Supp. 2008).
41 Markon & White, supra note 6.
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B. The Importance of Continuing to use Military Commissions
As outlined above, the President and Congress have the
authority to establish military commissions in certain situations.
This section discusses why the use of military commissions
should continue in the context of the current War on Terror.
President Obama recently stalled the use of military
commissions until their procedures can be reviewed.42 Instead of
military commissions, Obama is considering trying detainees in
United States federal courts, or setting up a new national
security court.43 This would be a devastating mistake for the
United States and its reputation.
First, although military commissions face some systemic
problems,44 they currently provide the only mechanism by which
to try suspected enemy combatants. One criticism of the MCA is
that it has taken a long time to develop.45 However, commissions
are finally in a position to move forward. Starting a new system
will place the United States back to square one and delay the
process even longer.46 The MCA and military commissions were
finally moving, and detainees were getting their day in court.
Scrapping the MCA and starting with some other new system
that will undoubtedly face more delays will simply not promote
justice.47
Second, there is no other viable option to replace military
commissions. Moving to federal court would undoubtedly destroy
the heightened national security protections imposed by MCA.48
See Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 22, 2009).
Id.
The American Civil Liberties Union website outlines several perceived problems
with military commissions. ACLU FACT SHEET, supra note 11. However, many of the
comments are overemphasized and were made prior to the application of the MCA. Not
all of the problems mentioned by the ACLU are apparent. See Ruling on Motion to
Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices, United States v.
Hamdan (July 20, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ruling%20on%
20Motion%20to%20Suppress%2029%20and%20D-044%20Ruling%201%20(2).pdf.
45 See Ruling on Motion to Dismiss—Speedy Trial, United States v. Hamdan (July
20, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ruling%20on%20Motion%
20to%20Dismiss%20Speedy%20Trial%20D-046.pdf. It appears that trials have not moved
faster because of the difficulty of collecting evidence world-wide and all of the appeals at
the federal level that slow the process of military commissions.
46 In response to the idea of President Obama creating a National Security Court,
Ken Gude of the Guardian stated: “Any attempt to circumvent a judicial system designed
to ensure a fair trial will be met with deserved scorn and would likely lead to additional
delays as defendants challenge procedures designed specifically to relax evidentiary
standards and restrict defence and public access to classified evidence.” Ken Gude,
Guantánamo's Days are Numbered, GUARDIAN (England), Nov. 11, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/nov/11/barack-obamaguantanamo-bay.
47 See id.
48 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18. But see Ann Woolner,
42
43
44
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To protect national security, the MCA allows certain evidence to
be considered at trial that would otherwise be excluded by a
civilian criminal court.49 The use of the civilian federal court
system will bar certain reliable evidence, and force the United
States to turn over highly confidential national security
information.50 Quite simply, for a just outcome with respect to
detainees who have expressed their intent to destroy the United
States,51 all reliable evidence must be admitted at trial.52
Therefore, the use of the federal court system to try defendants
seriously undermines national security—something that should
be a primary goal when dealing with the most dangerous people
in the world.
Finally, scrapping the MCA may potentially send the wrong
message to the international community. Cutting losses should
not be done unnecessarily; if the United States gives up on the
MCA it would be prematurely giving up on a set of fixable
problems. A simple application of the MCA’s evidentiary rules to
Hamdan demonstrates their effectiveness.53 Furthermore, it is
Fixing Terror Laws No Harder Than Economy, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 9,
2008, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/391308_woolneronline10.html.
Woolner
suggests moving detainees to federal courts because a federal judge knows how to deal
with coercive evidence and, even if a terrorist is released, it won’t matter because the
government will monitor him.
49 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18.
50 Chris Selley argues, despite the occurrence of torture with respect to certain
detainees in the past, placing them in American courts would be a mistake because they
may not get convicted because of procedural rules—a risk that cannot be taken. Chris
Selley, Give Barack Obama a Chance to Fail on Guantanamo, NAT’L POST FULL
COMMENT, Dec. 16, 2008,
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2008/12/16/chris-selleygive-barack-obama-a-chance-to-fail-on-guantanamo.aspx; see also Yoo, supra note 22, at
86–87 (explaining why military commissions should admit more evidence than a federal
court).
51 Many detainees have been quoted as saying, “[i]f I'm let out of here, I will go
immediately and start killing Americans again.” Roundtable Press Interview with
Condoleezza Rice, Sec. of State, in London, Eng. (Dec. 1, 2008).
52 This Comment does not advocate torture, however it may be defined. However,
the MCA allows for the admissibility of statements obtained through some degree of
coercion in particular situations in order to protect national security. See 10 U.S.C. §
948r(c)–(d) (2008). Many are opposed to this section of the MCA as some suggest it may
promote torture and kangaroo courts. See, e.g., Edward M. Gomez, Bush Signs Torture
Bill; Americans Lose Essential Freedom, S.F. GATE, Oct. 17, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/
cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/detail?blogid=15archive/&entry_id=9952 (“By signing into law the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Bush has made it legal for the C.I.A. to continue
operating torture facilities in undisclosed, foreign countries . . . .”). However, the
evidentiary exception may be necessary for a fair trial, and may also benefit the defense.
See Ruling on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices,
supra note 44, at 15–16. In fact, the coercive measures Hamdan complained about were
only used in response to his misbehavior and unwillingness to cooperate. See id. at 15.
53 Some evidence obtained by coercion was allowed after looking at the totality of the
circumstances and the interests of justice, while other evidence was excluded. Ruling on
Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices, supra note 44,
at 15.
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hard to criticize the commissions as “Kangaroo Courts” in light of
Hamdan’s minimal sentence.54
That being said, changes must be made because commissions
are far from perfect. The rest of this Comment is devoted to
addressing an area of change necessary to the MCA, namely the
current sentencing rules and guidelines.
II. POLICIES AND FAULTS BEHIND THE MCA AND ITS
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
On October 17, 2006, President Bush signed the MCA.55 By
creating an extensive set of rules that govern military
commissions, Congress tried to ensure that detainees will be
given a fair trial.56 This Part examines the MCA and the goals it
is meant to accomplish.
A. The General Intent Behind the MCA
The general intent of the MCA, as provided by Congress, is
to grant enemy combatants with fair trials, but also to protect
national security.57 Section 948b(f) of the MCA reads: “A military
commission established under this chapter is a regularly
constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’ for
purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.”58 By
calling for fair judicial procedures, this section of the MCA shows
the strong intent of Congress to hold fair trials for enemy
combatants.59
Congressional meetings show the intent to preserve national
security and provide fair trials. Senator McConnell was quoted
as saying, “[the MCA] is vitally important because this bill
protects our national security, it protects classified information,
and it protects the rights of defendants.”60 Senator Graham, a
military lawyer for twenty years, said on the congressional record
54 Will Dunham, U.S. Terror Tribunals: Fair Trial or Kangaroo Court, REUTERS,
May 26, 2003.
55 Press Briefing, Dep't of Defense, New Military Commissions Rules (Jan. 18,
2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
3868.
56 Id. (“The act and the procedures contained in this manual will ensure that alien
unlawful enemy combatants who are suspected of war crimes and other -- and certain
other offenses are prosecuted before regularly constituted courts affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.”).
57 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18; see generally 152 CONG. REC.
S10354 (2006).
58 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2008).
59 152 CONG. REC. S10354, (2006) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
60 Id.
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about the MCA, “[m]y goal is to render justice to the terrorists,
even though they will not render justice to us.”61
If the intent behind the MCA is clearly to protect national
security while preserving fundamental liberties, then it naturally
follows that the goal in sentencing should be the same. However,
Congress has made sentencing under the MCA ambiguous.
B. Intent behind the Sentencing Guidelines in the MCA: The
Policy and Intent behind Allowing Judges Great Discretion
When Sentencing Convicted Terrorists
The MCA and Chapter X of the Manual for Military
Commissions (hereinafter MMC) provide judges with fairly loose
sentencing procedures and principles and, as such, judges have
wide discretion in deciding how to sentence a convicted enemy
combatant.62 In general, the MCA is in place to provide basic
guidelines for sentencing,63 while the MMC deals with the
specifics of sentencing procedures.64
1.

Sentencing Guidelines and Safeguards: How the MCA
and MMC Impose Safeguards to Prevent Abuse of
Discretion
As it appears, the MCA and MMC provide only minimal
guidelines that commissions must follow when sentencing. In
addition to the minimal procedural requirements discussed
below, the MMC generally allows commissions to sentence any
way they deem fit after hearing aggravating and mitigating
factors.65
Rule 1002 of the MMC reads: “Subject to the
limitations in this manual . . . the sentence to be adjudged is a
matter within the discretion of the military commission.”66 As it
appears, so long as a commission stays within the bounds of the
sentencing limits provided by 10 U.S.C. section 950v,67 then its
sentence shall be considered legitimate.
While there is much discretion given to the commission in
sentencing, the MCA and MMC may provide procedural
Id. (statement of Sen. Graham).
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, pt. II, ch. X (2007),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/MANUAL%20FOR%20MILITARY%
20COMMISSIONS%202007%20signed.pdf [hereinafter MMC].
63 See 10 U.S.C. § 948d(d) (Supp. 2008) (“A military commission under this chapter
may . . . adjudge any punishment not forbidden by this chapter, including the penalty of
death when authorized under this chapter or the law of war.”); see also id. § 949m(a)–(c).
64 See MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1001, 1006–07, 1009–11.
65 Id. at R. 1002.
66 Id. (emphasis added).
67 10 U.S.C. § 950v (Supp. 2008) (providing a list of crimes punishable by military
commissions, and the maximum punishment that may be given for each crime).
61
62
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safeguards to combat an abuse of discretion. First, a minimum of
two-thirds of the commission’s members are to determine the
convict’s sentence.68 This provision helps keep discretion in
check by taking the power from one single judge and spreading it
to an entire panel. Another safeguard allows the “Convening
Authority”69 of the commission to reduce any sentence that may
have been handed down by the commission.70 Again, this is
another way to check the discretion of a commission as it allows
the reduction of an overly harsh sentence.
Finally, once convicted, a defendant may appeal the sentence
to the Court of Military Commission Review, then to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and finally
to the Supreme Court of the United States.71 The appellate
procedure afforded the detainees is another way to limit the
amount of discretion of a military commission.72
In general, although some procedures with regard to
sentencing are provided in the MCA and MMC, “[t]he broad
mandatory maximums . . . stand as the only meaningful
substantive restraints on the sentencing discretion of military
commissions.”73 Thus, despite minimal safeguards to prevent
abuse of discretion, commissions are generally free to sentence as
they please.
2. Intent Behind Sentencing in the MCA
The primary goal of sentencing in military commissions
should be no different than the goal of the MCA; to enhance the
protection of the United States while preserving fundamental
notions of justice for the detainees.74 However, the lack of
Id. § 949m(a).
The Convening Authority is the one who decides to prosecute certain charges. The
Convening Authority also appoints the Chief Judge of the Military Commissions Trial
Judiciary. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18.
70 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 2008). The MCA is similar to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure in this respect. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (“Upon the government's
motion made within one year of sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if the
defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or
prosecuting another person.”).
71 10 U.S.C. §§ 950c, 950f, 950g (2008); see also Press Briefing, Dep’t of Defense,
supra note 55.
72 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for an appeal from the district
court to the appellate court and then to the Supreme Court, while the rules in the MCA
allow for three appeals and review by the convening authority. Compare FED. R. APP. P. 3
and SUP. CT. R. 10 with 10 U.S.C. §§ 950b, 950c, 950f, 950g (2008).
73 Note, Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?: Evaluating the Usefulness of Determinate
Sentencing for Military Commissions and International Criminal Law, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1848, 1855–56 (2007) [hereinafter Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?]. This note puts forth the
notion that proportionality and crime control are other policies behind the sentencing
discretion given to commissions. See id. at 1862–64.
74 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18.
68
69
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information provided by Congress makes it difficult for a
commission to determine exactly what to aim towards when
sentencing.
On one hand, there is the theory that, because the MCA was
created to protect national security and to put dangerous
terrorists behind bars,— the main intent was to provide for harsh
sentences.75 For example, a death sentence for a non-violent
crime such as spying76 could promote national security through
deterrence and incapacitation.77 However, while the death
penalty is allowed under the MCA and MMC,78 and has
traditionally been allowed within other military commissions,79
the strict procedural requirements for enforcing the death
penalty make it an unlikely sentence.80 An example of this was
displayed in the recent case of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al
Bahlul, a high-level Al Qaeda operative that was convicted, but
only sentenced to life in prison.81 If he was not given the death
penalty under the current MCA, it is hard to imagine that any
terrorist will be.
If Congress had intended for the harshest sentence possible
to be handed out after a conviction, it most certainly would have
stated so. Further, military commissions do not seem to be
following the goal of promoting national security, as the only two
cases decided did not grant the harshest sentence that could be
imposed: (1) al Bahlul was not sentenced to death, but rather life
in prison;82 and (2) Hamdan was sentenced to effectively five
months in prison.83 In addition, a third case was settled before
trial, and the detainee was released with almost no
punishment.84
On the other hand, Congress surely did not provide that a
commission grant light sentences in order to preserve
fundamental principles of justice. While the non-use of the death
penalty in recent cases may show intent to preserve fundamental
principles of justice, Congress did in fact call for the death
See Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?, supra note 73, at 1862–63.
See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(27) (2008).
See Laser Beam or Blunderbuss, supra note 73, at 1863.
MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1004.
CUTLER, supra note 24, at 15.
See MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1004.
Al Bahlul also contributed seriously to September 11. Further, al Bahlul made
propaganda and training videos for al Qaeda and even volunteered to be a September
11th hijacker. See Charge Sheet of al Bahlul, supra note 7. Even after being convicted, al
Bahlul was still not sentenced to death. McFadden, supra note 4.
82 McFadden, supra note 4.
83 See Glaberson, supra note 4.
84 McFadden, supra note 4 (“A third prisoner, Australian David Hicks, reached a
plea agreement that sent him home to serve a nine-month prison sentence.”).
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
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penalty upon conviction of certain crimes.85 While the MCA
provides safeguards to help avoid an abuse of discretion, these
safeguards do not prevent the imposition of the harshest
sentence possible. The commission is to take into account all
aggravating and mitigating factors and grant a just sentence.86
As such, any given commission can grant a harsh or light
sentence. Thus, depending on the mood of a commission on any
given day, a convicted may be sentenced to death if the crime
calls for it.
Further, Congress did not explicitly state what a commission
should keep in mind when determining a sentence, and as such,
Congress has granted wide discretion to commissions and
provided them with little sentencing guidance.87 For example,
the MMC through its sentencing guidelines advocates that the
goal in sentencing is to punish the defendant in a way that trial
counsel sees fit88—this shows the clear intent of Congress to
allow the commission to punish as they please. Whether it is to
promote national security or to preserve fundamental rights of
the convicted, a military commission’s sentence should conform
to some type of standard. The next section examines the
practical problems created from ambiguous sentencing guidelines
that provide a large amount of discretion to military
commissions.
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY MCA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
Once the MCA was applied at trial, problems surfaced that
were not anticipated when the MCA was enacted, particularly in
dealing with sentencing. It appears that ambiguous sentencing
requirements created some confusion in military commissions.
Further, these problems are harder to remedy as the MCA has
rarely been used.89 Thus, there is minimal precedent to follow.

85 See generally 10 U.S.C. § 950v (2008) (providing a list of all crimes that a detainee
can be charged with and the possible sentences that may accompany a conviction).
86 See MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1001.
87 See Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?, supra note 73, at 1856 (“Because the
commissions face hard limits only at the margins, these conditions can be described as
‘bounded discretion.’”).
88 MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1001(g) (providing that trial counsel can argue various
different punishment theories that should be applied).
89 See Glaberson, supra note 4.

WOLENSKY

2009]

10/15/2009 6:43 PM

Discretionary Sentencing in Military Commissions

735

A. Time Held Counts Towards Time Served: The Application of
the MCA to Hamdan and the Unfortunate Confusion that
Ensued
While it is clear that Congress gave full authority to
sentence convicted terrorists via military commissions,90
Congress provided ambiguous guidelines and procedures for
sentencing.91 Naturally, when the MCA was applied for the first
time, problems surfaced.
One such problem was that of
administrative credit.92 Administrative credit is the ruling of a
court that grants pre-trial time held in prison toward the
sentence given; it is a way of reducing a convict’s sentence.93
Administrative credit is currently allowed under the Federal
Criminal Justice system in certain situations.94 The question
then becomes, should detainees brought to trial via military
commissions be entitled to administrative credit? The rules and
procedures in the MCA do not provide an answer to that
question.
When Hamdan was sentenced to five and a half years in
prison the commission granted administrative credit to count
towards his sentence.95 Effectively, his sentence of five and a
half years was reduced to roughly five months, and, in November
2008, he was released to Yemen to serve out the rest of his
sentence.96 Immediately following the sentence, the government
filed a motion regarding the issue of administrative credit,
requesting that the commission be reconvened, told of the error of

See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2008).
See supra notes 65, 87–88 and accompanying text.
See Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1.
See Michael L. Kanabrocki, Revisiting United States v. Allen: Applying Civilian
Pretrial Confinement Credit for Unrelated Offenses Against Court-Martial Sentences to
Post-Trial Confinement Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(2), 2008 ARMY LAW. 1, 1 (Aug. 2008).
94 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2008) (“A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of
a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date
the sentence commences”). Administrative credit in the federal system can be granted in
two circumstances: “(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the
commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” Id.
95 Markon & White, supra note 6. The commission granted administrative credit
claiming they had the authority to do so. However, the government claims that nothing
in the MCA or MMC allows for the granting of administrative authority. Corrected
Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1. Although the commission did
not state where they drew the authority to grant administrative credit, it is possible that
the commission believed they had authority to grant administrative credit via case
precedent. See United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126, 128 (C.M.A. 1984) (granting
administrative credit). The Court of Military Appeals in Allen was the first military court
to grant administrative credit. Kanabrocki, supra note 93, at 1.
96 Josh White & William Branigin, Hamdan To Be Sent To Yemen, WASH. POST, Nov.
25, 2008, at A1.
90
91
92
93
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administrative credit, and to issue a new sentence.97 The
government contended that Hamdan was held pre-trial as an
enemy combatant and as such he should not be granted
administrative credit.98
Judge Allred and the military
commission refused to reconsider the sentence without
explanation.99 Thus, the issue of administrative credit was never
decided.
Failure to resolve the dispute over administrative credit
creates several other problems.
First, the clash between
prosecutor and commission is sure to arise again and, depending
on the military commission, the result may be different—that is,
administrative credit may not be granted. Thus, the lack of
standards will create inconsistent results, which will lead to
instability for military commissions.100
Second, Congress has not taken action to quell the confusion.
Congress was granted the authority by the Supreme Court to
write the MCA and rules that govern commissions.101 The idea of
administrative credit may have been foreseeable to Congress, as
there is a federal statute counterpart102 and previous military
cases have granted administrative credit.103 Yet Congress did
not explicitly state whether granting administrative should be
allowed.
As stated above, both the prosecution and the
commission have valid arguments for and against granting

97 Essentially the government argued that Hamdan was held as an enemy
combatant pursuant to the Geneva Convention and as such his time held at Guantanamo
is a separate issue from the sentence he was given for the crimes he committed.
Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1; Posting of Lyle
Denniston to SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog. com/wp/?s=hamdan (Oct. 19, 2008,
4:01 PM).
98 Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1.
99 It appears that Commission Judge Allred read the briefs and did not provide a
reason as to why the motion was refused. See Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration and
Sentencing, United States v. Hamdan, [full case citation] (court & year) (docket no.),
available
at,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/hamdansentence-order-10-29-08.pdf;
Posting
of
Lyle
Denniston
to
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog. com/wp/?s=hamdan (Oct. 30, 2008, 3:14 PM).
100 Although dealing with a different set of military courts and problems,
commissions that tried World War II criminals faced similar problems with inconsistent
results. Eventually, it was the inconsistencies that led to the undermining of the
legitimacy of the commissions. Durwood "Derry" Riedel, The U.S. War Crimes Tribunals
at the Former Dachau Concentration Camp: Lessons for Today?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
554, 575 (2006).
101 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 653 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part). Although the Supreme Court found military commissions recently set up by the
President Bush unconstitutional, it invited Congress to make a set of rules that govern
military commissions; thus the MCA was enacted. Regina Fitzpatrick, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: Implications for the Geneva Conventions, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 339, 347

(2007).
102
103

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2008).
United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126, 129–29 (C.M.A. 1984).
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administrative credit to detainees but, until a rule is created,
confusion will continue to ensue and resources will be wasted. As
a result, sentences will continue to lack legitimacy and validity.
Finally, this dispute creates embarrassment for the United
States nationally and aboard as the inter-branch conflict remains
unresolved. Clearly, the dispute over administrative credit must
be solved. However, it is not the only problem that exists with
regard to sentencing. The commissions currently have too much
discretion in sentencing, as discussed in the next Section.
B. Confusion and Uncertain Results: How Lack of a Guiding
Principle led to Serious Problems with Regard to Sentencing
While a lack of rules led to an obvious conflict between
different branches of government, the amount of discretion given
to a commission combined with minimal guiding principles
created another set of problems that may not be readily
apparent. Uncertain and inconsistent sentences can lead to
serious problems that undermine the validity of military
commissions.104 A goal of most sentencing schemes is to provide
just sentences. For example, one goal of the United States
Sentencing Commission105 is to “provide certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing.”106 While a goal of military
commissions may be to provide fairness in sentencing,107 there is
no stated “purpose” of sentencing.
The ability of the commission to sentence not based on a
definitive standard will create confusion and uncertain results.
One problem created by such discretion given to commissions is
those attorneys, defendants, the prosecution, the government and
even the public have little idea about how a convicted individual
may be sentenced.
For example, when Hamdan was
sentenced,108 the prosecution was disappointed;109 President
104 When Congress was creating new federal sentencing laws, one aim was to rid the
system of inconsistent sentences. Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984:
A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 98 (1988) (“The legislators were concerned
that disparities generated disrespect for the law . . . .”).
105 The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency that helps
develop sentencing guidelines for federal courts, studies sentencing issues and proposes
solutions. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION
1–2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/general/
USSCoverview_2005.pdf.
106 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2008) (emphasis added).
107 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18.
108 Glaberson, supra note 4.
109 While the prosecution sought thirty years, they were not too upset by the lighter
sentence handed down to Hamdan as they were hopeful that the eighty other detainees to
come to be tried would receive harsher sentences. Alan Gomez, Bin Laden Driver Gets 5
½-Year Sentence, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2008, at A1. However, one prosecutor, John
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Bush and the Pentagon were pleased;110 Hamdan was thrilled
with the sentence;111 and the public was seemingly unsure as to
the appropriate reaction toward the sentence he received.112
However, a different commission might grant life in prison to a
detainee convicted of the same charge as Hamdan.113 One
consequence of this uncertainty is that it will be harder for both
sides to plea bargain as neither side will be able to gauge the
strength of their case.114 This uncertainty further creates chaotic
and disorganized results with no real pattern, which reduces the
legitimacy of the MCA.
Inconsistent results come about when each commission is
allowed to sentence as they please. For Example, Ali Hamza
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was charged and convicted of
conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison.115 According to the
MMC and MCA, al Bahlul could have been sentenced to death,116
but the commission decided against it. Currently, in a joint trial,
five co-conspirators involved in the September 11 attacks117 are
likely to be convicted and sentenced for the same crimes that al
Bahlul committed. However, there is nothing in the MCA or
MMC to stop this commission from sentencing the coconspirators to death instead of life in prison. Clearly every case
is different; each has its own set of facts and, as such, each
Murphy, was quoted as saying: “Your sentence should say the United States will hunt you
down and give you a harsh but appropriate sentence if you provide material support for
terrorism.” Glaberson, supra note 4.
110 The White House and the Pentagon seemed pleased with the sentence as it
demonstrated the fairness of the commissions when Hamdan was given a seemingly mild
sentence. Jamie McIntyre, Bin Laden's Former Driver Guilty in Terror Trial, CNN.com,
Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/08/06/hamdan.trial/index.html.
111 Hamdan appeared apologetic and looked forward to his release. Markon & White,
supra note 6.
112 See Glaberson, supra note 4; McIntyre, supra note 110.
113 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25) (Supp. 2008) (providing that one who gives material
support or resources for terrorism “may be punished as a military commission under this
chapter may direct.”).
114 An inability to plea bargain can lead to a waste of resources because many more
cases are likely to go to trial. Further, military commissions may become flooded with
detainees as trials in general will take longer. Steven E. Walburn, Should the Military
Adopt an Alford-Type Guilty Plea?, 44 A.F. L. REV. 119, 120–22 (1998).
115 McFadden, supra note 4. Al Bahlul was given a life sentence, so the defect in
administrative credit was not present. See id.
116 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(28) (Supp. 2008) (“Any person subject to this chapter who
conspires to commit one or more substantive offenses triable by military commission
under this chapter, and who knowingly does any overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death”); see
also MMC, supra note 62, at IV-21 to 22.
117 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek bin 'Attash, Ramzi
Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi, are all being
charged with conspiracy for their acts leading up to and on September 11. See generally
September 11 Co-Conspirators Charge Sheets, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/commissionsCo-conspirators.html (follow “Referred Charges” hyperlinks).
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sentence should reflect those differences. However, the case of al
Bahlul is factually similar to that of the five co-conspirators of
September 11. A sentence of death for the five co-conspirators
would be an inconsistent result, creating instability in military
commissions.
Although there may be some advantages to allowing such
discretion,118 ensuring that military commissions are legitimate
should be the ultimate goal. The uncertainty and inconsistent
outcomes that may result will lead to a perception that
undermines the validity of the courts. The final section of this
Comment examines possible solutions to the problems outlined
above.
IV. TWO RULES TO IMPROVE THE VALIDITY OF MILITARY
COMMISSIONS
The overall goal of Congress should be to improve the
legitimacy of the MCA and military commissions such that, as
they continue to go forward, the United States remains protected,
while at the same time detainees are given fair trials. Incident to
this goal is the improvement of the sentencing guidelines in the
MCA.
A. Fixing the Immediate Problem: Administrative Credit
Should be Allowed
Congress should expressly authorize military commissions to
grant administrative credit under certain circumstances. In
other words, a convict might be entitled to deduct time already
served if a commission deems it appropriate. In order to preserve
the goals behind the MCA—preserving national security while
protecting a right to a fair trial—administrative credit must be
granted in certain situations.
First, as discussed above, military commissions currently
have the authority to grant administrative credit. According to
common law and precedent, the military has authority to grant
administrative credit.119 Further, administrative credit may be
granted in federal criminal cases in certain situations under 18
U.S.C. section 3585(b).120 While there is also authority to support

118 See Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?, supra note 73, at 1864 (“A high tolerance for
variability in sentencing may help the commissions respond to the shifting demands of
the war on terrorism.”).
119 See United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126, 129 (C.M.A. 1984).
120 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2008).
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denying administrative credit,121 the practical effects of allowing
for such credit should persuade Congress to do so.
A rule allowing for administrative credit will only apply to a
small number of cases. Obviously, administrative credit will not
apply in all cases, as detainees such as al Bahlul, who have
committed the most egregious acts, will undoubtedly serve life in
prison.122 Also, despite the ability to grant administrative credit,
it must not be an absolute guarantee and only limited to certain
situations.123 Because of the small number of cases to which
administrative credit may be limited, the release of potentially
dangerous terrorists following a reduced sentence becomes less
likely and, as such, national security will still be preserved.
Every person tried by a military commission will likely have
been detained pre-trial. A law allowing for administrative credit
protects the fundamental rights of detainees by acting as a
safeguard against unlawful pre-trial detainment. Allowing the
application of administrative credit would act as one way124 to
release detainees who may not have committed serious crimes
but have been held for a long time. Hamdan was likely granted
administrative credit because the commission deemed he had
already served his sentence.125
The ability to grant
administrative credit allows a commission to look at the facts of a
particular case—why and how long a detainee has been held—
and allows for application of a just sentence. As such, a rule
allowing for administrative credit also promotes justice.
The main objection to administrative credit is that pre-trial
detention is independent of the crime committed and resulting
sentence and thus should not count toward the sentence.126

121 The government contends that the Geneva Convention allows for the detainment
of enemy combatants until the current conflict is over and, thus, the detainees are held
independent of the charges against them and should be forced to serve the full sentence
given to them. See Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at
3‒ 5.
122 See McFadden, supra note 4.
123 For example, 18 U.S.C. section 3585(b) (2008) allows administrative credit only
where a detainee is held “(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after
the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.”
124 Another way enemy combatants can challenge their detainment is through habeas
corpus review. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 12, 2008).
125 Although the commission did not state the reasons why it granted administrative
credit, it clearly believed Hamdan had been detained for too long. See Corrected
Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1.
126 The prosecution’s argument is that the detainees were held as enemy combatants
and their detainment had nothing to do with the crimes for which they were ultimately
charged. Id. at 6. See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“The United
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately
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Traditionally, in order to be eligible for administrative credit, a
person must have been detained in connection with their crime or
any other charge they were arrested for after their original
crime.127 Clearly, it can also be argued that the reason these
detainees are held is because they committed the crimes for
which they are ultimately charged. As such, they were detained
in connection with their crime and thus should be granted
administrative credit.
Because there is authority to grant administrative credit,
and the practical effects of allowing administrative credit are
crucial in providing stability for military commissions, a law
permitting administrative credit in certain situations, when the
commission deems it necessary, must be enacted. The next
section discusses a possible solution to the problems caused by
providing commissions with wide discretion without any clear
sentencing guidelines.
B. Fixing the Guidelines: Commissions Should Implement the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The main problem with the large amount of discretion given
to commissions is the uncertainty and inconsistency of the
results that have developed. If the goal of military commissions
is to ensure fair trials while preserving national security, the
current arbitrary sentencing procedures will not satisfy either
objective. The easiest and most effective change would be to
model the commission sentencing guidelines after the federal
sentencing guidelines.128 A sentencing scheme modeled after the
Federal Rules of Sentencing would be effortless to create, and
determined to be Taliban combatants who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the
United States.’”)
127 See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2008). For an analysis of different types of sentencing
credit with respect to the military, see Michael G. Seidel, Giving Service Members the
Credit They Deserve: A Review of Sentencing Credit and Its Application, 1999 ARMY LAW.
1 (1999).
128 The federal sentencing guidelines are generally governed by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, part of which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2008). Pub. L. No, 98473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017 (1984). These guidelines were passed in response to many of the
same problems in federal court that current military commissions are facing—
inconsistent results and arbitrary sentencing. Weigel, supra note 104, at 98. Two
reasons the federal sentencing guidelines were established were to “incorporate the
purposes of sentencing (i.e., just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation),” and to “provide certainty and fairness by . . . avoiding unwarranted
disparity among offenders with similar characteristics convicted of similar criminal
conduct.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 105, at 1. Another goal of the sentencing
guidelines was to “increase the certainty and severity of punishment by eliminating
parole and increasing sentencing severity for some crimes.” See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 38
(2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf.
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could be implemented relatively quickly without additional
delays for detainees who are awaiting trial.
Application of the federal sentencing guidelines will surely
provide stability and thus improve the legitimacy of the MCA.
Essentially, the federal guidelines provide judges with
sentencing ranges that account for the seriousness of the crime
and the defendant’s past criminal record.129 Generally, the
guidelines provide for sentences that may be consistently
applied, and were created to remedy the exact problem that
military commissions are having—inconsistent and arbitrary
outcomes that result from too much discretion.130 The use of the
same guidelines in every military commission removes the threat
of a panel of military members sentencing a “low level terrorist”
such as Hamdan to death, and forces each commission to abide
by the sentencing rules. At the same time, some judicial
discretion is preserved as the commissions will look at the
detailed facts of every case and determine which sentence to
apply much like federal judges do.131
By following the federal sentencing guidelines, fairness and
protection of detainees’ rights will be preserved. First, the
federal guidelines are part of a proven system that has been in
place for decades.132 The use of this established system will quiet
doubters who believe that commissions are “Kangaroo Courts.”133
Further, the use of the guidelines allows Congress to determine
the appropriate sentence for a particular crime, rather than
allow a military commission to do so on a case-by-case basis. If a
convict falls within a sentencing range that is indeed too harsh
for one reason or another, the United States Supreme Court has
found that “while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must
consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.”134 As such, a commission can still ensure that a
convict is given the sentence he deserves.
One objection to the use of the guidelines is that sentencing
flexibility will be removed and, essentially, Congress will be
making the sentencing decision.135 However, if the military
129 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 105, at 2.
The sentencing range is
determined by the point on the sentencing table where the criminal record and the
seriousness of the crime intersect. Id.
130 Id. at 1–2.
131 Weigel, supra note 104, at 101.
132 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 105, at 1–2.
133 See Dunham, supra note 54.
134 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
135 See Weigel, supra note 104, at 105 (“It is far better to have an independent judge
determine the appropriate sentence in any given case . . . than to turn that problem over
to a body which, in the end, acts as a Washington-headquartered restraint upon
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commissions are going to succeed, they need a stable foundation
to ensure their legitimacy. The use of these guidelines by
military commissions will institute a proven system that provides
consistency. And while one goal of the guidelines is to impose
harsher sentences,136 the use of the federal guidelines coupled
with the allowance of administrative credit will ensure that a
convicted detainee is given a fair and just sentence.
CONCLUSION
Even today, after roughly 233 years, new rules are routinely
created for United States criminal courts. Courts simply cannot
be created with one act from Congress; they need time to grow
and develop. While Congress tried to foresee many problems
regarding the MCA and military commissions, they were not able
to eliminate every problem. And even though problems appeared
in the MCA after Hamdan, current military commissions must
continue to be used as they are the most practical system in
place. Military Commissions must continue to improve their
validity, they must continue to grow.
Changes regarding
sentencing must be made in order to improve the legitimacy of
military commissions.
A system resembling the Federal Guidelines will provide
certain and non-arbitrary results. While some believe that the
guidelines will provide overly harsh sentences, allowing
administrative credit may effectively reduce sentences while
preserving some discretion for the commissions. As such, each
detainee will receive the sentence he deserves and the United
States will remain protected.

judgments best determined locally and individually.”).
136 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 128, at 38.

